Configurations of Control: A Transaction Cost Approach by Speklé, R.F. (Roland)
  
 
 
 
Configurations of Control: 
A Transaction Cost Approach 
 
Roland F. Speklé 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2003-071-F&A 
Publication status / version 2003 
Number of pages 25 
Email address corresponding author spekle@few.eur.nl 
Address Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde 
Rotterdam School of Economics / Faculteit 
Economische Wetenschappen 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
PoBox 1738  
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  # 31-(0) 10-408 1182  
Fax: # 31-(0) 10-408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl 
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
Abstract In this paper, I present a theory of management control based on Transaction Cost Economics. 
This theory seeks to integrate into a single framework a set of insights as to the nature of the 
organization’s activities, the control problems that are inherent in these activities, and the 
unique problem solving potential of various archetypal control structures. The gist of the 
argument is that activities predictably differ in the control problems to which they give rise, 
whereas control archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, and that alignments between 
the two can be explained by delineating the efficiency properties of the match. This is a 
contingent configuration approach. It is a configuration theory in that it offers a set of ideal 
types, conceived of as internally consistent and discriminating clusters of attributes from 
multiple dimensions that have a specific effect on control structure effectiveness as the variable 
to be explained. But it is also a contingent approach in that it specifies the conditions in which 
each of the archetypes is most effective. 
5001-6182 Business 
5601-5689 
4001-4280.7 
Accountancy, Bookkeeping 
Finance Management, Business Finance, Corporation Finance 
Library of Congress 
Classification  
(LCC) 
HF 5657.4 Managerial accounting 
M Business Administration and Business Economics  
M 41 
G 3 
Accounting 
Corporate Finance and Governance 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  
(JEL) 
M 49 Accounting: Other 
85 A Business General 
225 A 
220 A 
Accounting General 
Financial Management 
European Business Schools 
Library Group  
(EBSLG) 
235 C Management accounting: control systems 
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 
85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen 
85.25 
85.30 
Accounting 
Financieel management, financiering 
Classification GOO 
85.25 Accounting 
Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie 
Accountancy, financieel management, bedrijfsfinanciering, besliskunde 
Keywords GOO 
Management control systems, Bedrijfscontrole, Transactiekosten 
Free keywords Management control theory, Transaction cost economics, Configuration theory 
 
 
 1
Configurations of Control: 
A Transaction Cost Approach 
 
 
ROLAND F. SPEKLÉ 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
School of Economics 
Department of Accounting & Finance 
Room H14-31 
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
e-mail: spekle@few.eur.nl 
Phone: +31 (10) 4081435 
Fax: +31 (10) 4089171 
 
Working Paper, august 2003 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, I present a theory of management control based on Transaction Cost Econom-
ics. This theory seeks to integrate into a single framework a set of insights as to the nature 
of the organization’s activities, the control problems that are inherent in these activities, 
and the unique problem solving potential of various archetypal control structures. The gist 
of the argument is that activities predictably differ in the control problems to which they 
give rise, whereas control archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, and that 
alignments between the two can be explained by delineating the efficiency properties of the 
match. This is a contingent configuration approach. It is a configuration theory in that it 
offers a set of ideal types, conceived of as internally consistent and discriminating clusters 
of attributes from multiple dimensions that have a specific effect on control structure 
effectiveness as the variable to be explained. But it is also a contingent approach in that it 
specifies the conditions in which each of the archetypes is most effective. 
 
Key words: Management control theory, Transaction cost economics, Configuration theory 
1. Introduction 
As a field of academic inquiry, management control (MC) studies the processes and mecha-
nisms that organizations use to influence the behavior of organizational actors so as to 
contribute to the achievement of some pervasive objectives of the organization. In this 
paper, I develop an alternative theory of MC. This theory is best characterized as a contingent 
configuration theory. That is to say, it features a set of control archetypes, alongside with the 
contingency factors that help to predict which of these archetypes is most effective in various 
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conditions. As such, this is a theory of MC effectiveness. But assuming that effectiveness is an 
important driver of control structure design, it is also a theory of control structure variety, 
addressing the important issue as to why control structures differ between (different parts of) 
organizations. 
 This theory draws heavily on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1996). In so doing, this paper adds to the incipient but rapidly growing literature that applies 
the insights of TCE to issues of MC (examples would include Colbert & Spicer, 1995; Covaleski, 
Dirsmith, & Samuel, 2003; Dekker (in press); Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Speklé, 2001; Spicer & 
Ballew, 1983; Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983; Van den Bogaard & Speklé, 2003; Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 1994; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vosselman, 2002). Some of these 
contributions concentrate on specific control problems, specific cases, or specific control 
instruments. Others –like the current paper- explicitly suggest that the usefulness of TCE 
extends well beyond the specific, and that it provides valuable input to a more general theory 
to support the study of MC structures. 
 The theory I develop integrates into a single, coherent framework a set of insights as to 
the nature of the organization’s activities, the control problems that are inherent in these 
activities, and the discriminating problem solving potential of various archetypal control 
structures. Each of these archetypes is a coherent, internally consistent configuration of 
control devices that has a unique problem solving potential, and that, consequently, can be 
associated with the contingent and predictable control problems that inhere in the organiza-
tional activities. The individual archetypes will be described using four broad dimensions that 
collectively cover the most important design parameters (cf. also Jensen & Meckling, 1992): 
(1) the organizational structure, e.g. level of centralization, room for discretionary behavior 
at different levels of management, and allocation and demarcation of responsibilities; (2) 
standardization, covering issues as to the source and relative importance of ex ante norms 
and standards to guide behavior; (3) monitoring and performance evaluation, comprising such 
matters as the scope and intensity of monitoring and the source and role of performance 
benchmarks; and (4) the reward and incentive structure. In this degree of specification 
resides one of the major differences between the current theory and alternative approaches. 
The literature offers many control typologies. Examples include Ouchi’s market, bureaucracy, 
and clan mechanisms (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), Merchant’s action, results, and personnel controls 
(Merchant, 1982), Snell’s behavior, output, and input control systems (Snell, 1992), and 
Hofstede’s types, ranging from routine control to political control (Hofstede, 1981). Although 
the approach that I develop in this paper is at least broadly consistent with this prior litera-
ture, it goes much further in dimensionalizing the types. 
 The reach of the approach extends beyond the individual organization to include control 
aspects of cooperative arrangements between firms (Speklé, 2001; Vosselman, 2002). Never-
theless, I will focus here on MC within the confines of the hierarchy. Within these confines, I 
will emphasize control at the level of the organizational subsystems (e.g. business units, 
divisions, departments, or more generally, more or less homogeneous centers of activities 
that are sufficiently important to warrant specialized control). Much of the argument has 
relevance also at different levels of analysis (mutatis mutandis) but it is at this level that the 
approach is best able to show its hand. It is also the level at which many interesting problems 
reside. 
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 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background 
to the configurational approach and offers some ideas and notions that may help to position 
the proposed theory in the academic discourse. In section 3, I develop the theory as such. 
Section 4 discusses how this theory can be tested and section 5 offers some final remarks.  
2. The Case for Configurational Thinking 
It has often been noted that control structures are compositions of a large number of differ-
ent elements (Flamholtz, 1983, 1996; Merchant, 1985a; Otley, 1980, 1999; Rotch, 1993). 
These elements include organizational design, the allocation of responsibility and account-
ability, planning and budgeting, performance evaluation practices, reward and incentive 
structures, and more. MC structures as they exist in reality differ with respect to the ele-
ments they include. Also, the elements as such can be designed and used in many different 
ways. Moreover, organizations differ in the relative importance they attach to the elements 
that make the structure. The obvious conclusion seems to be that MC structure variety is 
potentially bewildering. Indeed, “[if] organizations were complex amalgams of multiple 
attributes that could vary independently and continuously, the set of possible combinations 
would be infinite” (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993: 1175). Fortunately, however, organizations 
cannot be so described. At least, those taking a configurational perspective claim that the 
potential variety is limited by the attributes’ tendency somehow to cluster into a relatively 
small number of coherent patterns. Thus, whereas the conceivable array of possible combina-
tions is enormous, most of these combinations lack a significant empirical counterpart. Only 
relatively few occur frequently (Meyer et al., 1993; Miller, 1999; Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). 
Accordingly, researchers in the configurational tradition seek to identify these patterns or –
which is the more usual term- configurations. A configuration is a “multidimensional constel-
lation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together” (Meyer et al. 
1993: 1175). Moreover, these researchers seek to generate typologies or taxonomies1, i.e. a 
finite set of discrete configurations that collectively describe a large proportion of the focal 
phenomena. 
 Configurations (also referred to as archetypes, ideal types, or gestalts, which terms are 
usually regarded as synonymous) are mental constructs that serve reflection, argumentation, 
and theorizing (Machlup, 1978). They represent phenomena that might exist, rather than 
actually existing phenomena. Thus, an ideal type represents a unique combination of the 
dimensions used to describe the set of ideal types that, as a combination, is expected to 
result in a specified level of the variable to be explained. Accordingly, organizational ideal 
types are not categories of organizations (Doty & Glick, 1994; cf. also Machlup, 1978). Rather, 
the ideal types function as theoretical cornerstones in the development of hypotheses (see 
section 4.1 for a discussion of the ramifications of this point). Usually, these hypotheses 
involve expected relationships between the similarity of an actual organization to an ideal 
type on the one hand, and the dependent variable on the other. A typical example of such a 
                                                 
1 The term typology is usually associated with a theoretically/conceptually derived set of 
configurations, whereas the term taxonomy refers to an empirically based set (Dess et al. 
1993; Doty & Glick, 1994; Meyer et al. 1993; Miller, 1999). 
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hypothesis would for instance assert that the closer the resemblance between an organization 
and an archetypal configuration, the more effective that organization will be. Moreover, the 
ideal types act as a sort of benchmark against which interesting observations present them-
selves more readily and that add contrast to the observations, facilitating analysis of complex 
phenomena and providing a language in which to cast the analysis. 
 Configuration research has gained quite a prominent position in the study of organization, 
particularly (but not exclusively) in the field of strategic management (Dess, Newport, & 
Rasheed, 1993; Doty & Glick, 1994; Miller, 1999; Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). Contributions 
include the seminal works of Mintzberg (1983), Miles & Snow (1978), and Miller & Friesen 
(1984), to name but a few of the classic references. The configurational theme has also found 
its way into economics, usually under the flag of complementarities (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1994; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990, 1995). Williamson’s TCE is configurational in nature too, 
although this property has not been emphasized much in the literature. In MC theory, configu-
rational thinking is present in for instance the work of Ouchi (1979, 1980). More recently, 
Moores & Yuen (2001) explicitly referred to their study as configurational. 
 There is much to be said in favor of the configurational approach2. As has already been 
pointed out, MC works through complex arrangements of different control mechanisms in 
which the individual mechanisms can take on many different manifestations and meanings. To 
add to this already overwhelming complexity, both the antecedents and consequences of 
control mechanisms and structures may be situation-contingent in various ways. If it is 
possible to capture this variety in a limited number of well-specified configurations, then that 
would certainly help to reduce the complexity involved in the attempt to understand control. 
 Another advantage of the configurational approach is that it moves beyond reductionist 
models built on linear or simple interaction relationships (Dess et al., 1993; Doty & Glick, 
1994; Meyer et al., 1993; Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). It has often been suggested that control 
mechanisms interact, so that the effects of an individual control mechanism are (partly) 
dependent on the structure of which it is part (see for instance Fisher, 1995, Otley, 1980). 
These interactions may take many different forms and may also be influenced by the wider 
(organizational) context (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Flamholtz, 1983; Hopwood, 1983; Otley, 
1984). Recognizing this, many MC-scholars lean towards a holistic stance, emphasizing that 
the attributes used to describe control structures in the organizational context have meaning 
collectively rather than individually. The key idea is that a control structure -conceived of as 
a package of control instruments- may not be reducible to its parts, and that understanding 
these parts may not add up to an understanding of the whole. This idea is also central to 
configuration thinking (Dess et al. 1993; Doty & Glick, 1994; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; 
Meyer et al. 1993; Miller, 1999). Rather than trying to disentangle the relationships between 
                                                 
2 There is also much to be said against the configurational approach. Or rather, much has 
been said against this approach to theorizing –the most serious critique being that configura-
tional theories are not real theories, but mere classification schemes (cf. Doty & Glick, 1994, 
for an overview; Meyer et al., 1993). However, although this criticism may well be appropri-
ate in some specific instances, it cannot be generalized to the approach as such and does not 
affect the credibility of the approach (Doty & Glick, 1994; cf. also Miller, 1999). For an 
especially passionate critique of the configurational approach, see Donaldson (1996, 2001). 
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the individual parts and analyzing their effects “a few variables at a time” (Miller, 1986: 
235), the configurational approach focuses on how organizational attributes fit together 
within each archetype, and on how these internally consistent sets of features impinge on the 
ultimate dependent variable -which is usually (some notion of) organizational effectiveness. 
Thus, configuration theories incorporate two different levels of theory: a ‘grand theory’ that 
generalizes to all organizations and ‘middle-range theories’ that apply solely to the individual 
types (Doty & Glick, 1994). The middle-range theories specify within each individual type the 
pattern of relationships among the descriptive variables, and articulate how this pattern 
supports internal consistency and achieves complementarities (cf. Milgrom & Roberts, 1995), 
or avoids organizational incompatibilities (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992). The grand theoreti-
cal assertions on the other hand specify how the individual types relate to the dependent 
variable (again: usually organizational effectiveness). These different levels of theory con-
tribute to a more synthesis-seeking orientation (Miller, 1986, 1999; Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). 
But the approach also allows inclusion in the theory of ‘embedded’, synergetic effects that 
cannot be represented very well through additive or interactive relationships. In addition, it 
is able to accommodate discontinuities -changes in kind rather than degree- and potential 
nonlinearities, i.e. the possibility that variables found to be positively related in one configu-
ration may be unrelated or inversely related in another (Doty & Glick, 1994; Meyer et al., 
1993; Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). 
 Of course, all this is only useful if configurations do in fact reflect reality, that is, only if 
common, non-random, internally homogeneous clusterings of attributes do in fact occur in 
the real world (Miller & Mintzberg, 1983). This is an empirical issue that cannot be settled a 
priori. Moreover, the configuration theory must be able to capture these clusterings suffi-
ciently fully, and must be able to make sense of them in a sufficiently illuminative way. This 
paper aspires to contribute to such a theory. 
3. A Transaction Cost Approach to Management Control 
3.1 The gist of the argument 
 
An organization depends on the contribution of a large number of individuals to achieve its 
aims. TCE suggests that MC structures can be understood as solutions to the coordination, 
adaptation, incentive and enforcement problems that arise in contracting for and controlling 
these contributions. These problems originate from two main sources: (1) the characteristics 
of human behavior; and (2) the attributes of the activities in which the organization engages, 
and the contributions required from the organization’s members to support these activities. 
On the behavioral side, TCE makes allowance for bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality refers to man’s limited cognitive and computational ability. Opportunism 
is “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985: 47), which may include calculated 
efforts to mislead and deceive. The nature of the activities and the required contributions 
can be defined discriminatingly through their scores on three dimensions: (1) uncertainty, or 
the extent to which the activities and desired contributions are amenable to ex ante pro-
gramming; (2) the degree of asset specificity, or the extent to which alternative uses of 
investments made to support the activity involve opportunity losses; and (3) the intensity of 
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ex post information asymmetry3, or the ability to assess the true quality of actually delivered 
performance. Given bounded rationality and opportunism, these features are predictably 
associated with distinctive control problems that need to be dealt with. Organizations try to 
cope with these problems by adopting appropriate MC structures. These come in an over-
whelming variety, but within this variety, a limited number of typical control patterns can be 
discerned: (1) arm’s length control, featuring outcome control based on market-derived 
standards; (2) machine control, which is administrative control based on codification of 
behavior or predefined performance targets; (3) exploratory control, which works from 
converging insights that accrue and spread during the process; and (4) boundary control, 
characterized by its proscriptive nature, emphasizing actions to be avoided. These archetypal 
control structures differ in their problem-solving ability, which make them appropriate for 
the governance of some activities and contributions, but not for others. Moreover, they differ 
in respect of cost, and ultimately, an empirically observed alignment of an activity with a 
control structure is explained by delineating the relative efficiency properties of the match. 
 
3.2 Effectiveness, efficiency, and remediableness 
 
TCE adopts a micro-analytical point of view in which the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis. Control structure effectiveness (or rather: efficiency, which is a stronger form of 
effectiveness in that it presupposes effectiveness) is also studied at that level. TCE asserts 
that the design of control arrangements is mainly driven by the generic urge to economize on 
transaction costs. Transaction costs include the relatively straightforward costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, but also –and foremost- the more elusive cost of 
maladaptation and adjustment that could be incurred in case of a mismatch between a 
transaction and its governance structure, resulting in the transaction drifting out of line 
because of self-serving and dysfunctional behavior. Explaining observed control structures, 
thus, comes down to demonstrating their relative efficiency in serving their purpose, which is 
to increase the probability that the transaction leads to satisfactory outcomes. 
 This is a very flexible and scaleable approach. Its general logic can be applied to various 
specific research questions at different levels of aggregation and analysis. In TCE, the central 
concepts as transactions and contracting are broadly construed, and can meaningfully be used 
to describe any relationship in which parties expect something from one another and are 
prepared to give something in return. This includes for instance the relationship between the 
organization and its substantive parts –be they business units, divisions, departments, or 
otherwise-, the lateral relations between those parts, as well as the relationship between 
senior and junior management within one of these parts, i.e. the kind of relationships MC is 
interested in. 
 But what about the assumption of efficiency? For surely, there is more to organization 
than efficiency, and reducing one’s explanations to motives of economizing may be consid-
                                                 
3 This third variable is usually not explicitly referred to in standard TCE, but it is nevertheless 
part of TCE’s analytical apparatus. The variable frequency –which is in fact among the 
standard variables of TCE- will be ignored because throughout this paper, I assume that 
frequency is sufficiently high to warrant the design of specialized governance. 
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ered rather procrustean indeed. The efficiency assumption, however, only applies to matters 
of contracting and control, not to the reasons organizations may have to engage in the 
activities that need to be controlled. The activities may be driven by a variety of motives, 
including purposes of a non-economizing nature. The approach suggested here accepts this, 
and works from these motives without questioning them. Only thereafter does the assumption 
of transaction cost efficiency come in: given what the organization wants from the activity, 
its control structure is designed in such a way to avoid wasting resources in getting the 
organization what it wants. This would seem sufficiently unobtrusive to accept it as part of 
the theory, at least until empirical evidence advises otherwise. 
 To assess transaction cost efficiency, TCE uses a comparative approach in which the 
properties and effects of the observed governance structure are confronted with those of 
alternative control arrangements that could realistically have been installed instead of the 
one actually chosen. The actual structure is considered efficient -and, consequently, ex-
plained- if this analysis reveals that the actual structure is better equipped to deal with the 
contractual problems inherent in the transaction than the alternatives, i.e. that none of the 
feasible alternatives could be implemented with expected net gains. For many purposes, this 
remediableness test (Williamson, 1996, 1999) can be applied in a wholly qualitative way, 
which is quite useful because of the difficulties involved in measuring transaction costs. 
Especially the costs of maladaptation are notoriously hard to measure, because they are 
opportunity costs. Yet these tend to be the most important. In many cases, however, one is 
able to demonstrate that the adopted governance structure has some unique features that 
are essential in coping with the relevant contractual problems and that cannot be replicated 
within another mode of governance. If the potential transaction costs associated with these 
problems are evidently large, the explanation of the actual structure may be based solely on 
the unquantified amount of these costs, for exact measurement of self-evidently large 
transaction cost differentials may safely be regarded as redundant. Now it is true, of course, 
that any such assessment of efficiency is necessarily provisional. After all, it is always con-
ceivable that there exists a superior, but hitherto ignored alternative. However, because the 
procedure urges the researcher to explicate the particulars of the efficiency assessment, it 
allows theoretical and empirical scrutiny and discussion of the argument. From an academic 
stance, this is good enough. 
 
3.3 The attributes of the activity and their implications 
 
The effects of uncertainty: programmable versus non-programmable contributions 
 
Uncertainty is a condition that can arise from many sources, including market dynamics, 
disturbances in the external environment, environmental complexity, task uncertainty, task 
complexity, interdependencies, and unfamiliarity. However, whatever the source, the effects 
are similar4: desired contributions are not amenable to up front programming, and maintain-
                                                 
4 This, of course, is a gross simplification. Many studies have differentiated between sources 
of uncertainty, and with good cause. Glossing over the details, however, may well be forgiv-
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ing flexibility to allow adaptation to events as they unfold and to information as it accrues 
becomes imperative. This basic insight –which also has a long history in MC, albeit under 
different names and in various guises5 -allows organizational activity to be grouped in two 
broad categories: (1) programmable activities, i.e. activities for which the organization 
possesses sufficient knowledge and information to decide in advance on the way in which they 
are to be executed in order to achieve success, or activities for which the outcomes that may 
realistically be expected to result from them can be defined ex ante; and (2) non-
programmable activities, i.e. activities for which the organization lacks the a priori ability 
and experience to relate actions to outcomes, or even lacks a clear idea as to what it wants 
to achieve. The availability of norms and standards in the first group permits a fairly compre-
hensive ex ante articulation of the characteristics of the contribution that is required from 
the members of the organization, and contracting for that contribution can be reasonably 
complete. Control, therefore, can be prescriptive or authoritative in nature, featuring rules 
of behavior, specific instructions, and relatively rigid performance targets, and focusing on 
assuring compliance to these pre-imposed norms. In the second group, in contrast, it is not 
possible to specify required contributions in advance. Due to the absence of ex ante stan-
dards, contracts must be of a general thrust nature, emphasizing a general commitment or 
sketching the broad confines within which performance ought to fit, rather than delineating 
an accurately specified contribution. 
 
Asset specificity: differential access to market discipline 
 
Asset specificity refers to the size of the opportunity losses that arise if the (physical or 
human) investments made to support the activity are to be put to alternative uses or users. 
The degree of asset specificity is strongly linked to the marketability of the investments. It is 
low in case of general-purpose assets for which a large and active market exists. Conversely, 
it is high in the case of specialized, custom-built assets for which there is no readily accessi-
ble alternative source of supply or demand. Activities of low asset specificity are expected to 
be governed by the market mechanism, and are outside the scope of this paper. Here, the 
concern is with activities that fall somewhere in the range of moderate to high asset specific-
ity. Moderate asset specificity implies the availability of a limited number of more or less 
comparable alternative sources of supply or demand. This number is too small to consign 
control to the ‘invisible hand’, but large enough to reduce the leeway for opportunism, either 
by lending credibility to the threat to take one’s business elsewhere when confronted with 
opportunistic behavior, or by providing relevant performance benchmarks that can be used 
for control purposes. In either case, market discipline -though not the sole control device- 
can be part of the control structure. This changes when asset specificity approaches the 
higher end of the continuum. Then, competition erodes up to the point of non-existence, and 
                                                                                                                                               
able in the context of the aim of the present paper –which is to provide the outlines of a new 
theoretical perspective. 
5 Early references would include for instance Burns & Stalker (1961), Thompson (1967), and 
Galbraith (1973). See also Chenhall (2003) for a recent overview of empirical work along 
these lines. 
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control has to come entirely from within the contractual relation: market-based discipline 
thus gives way to administrative control, ultimately to be supplanted by it. 
 
Ex post information asymmetry: assessing the quality of delivered contributions 
 
The third variable is the level of ex post information asymmetry, i.e. the extent to which the 
organization is able to observe and to assess perceptively the true quality of actually deliv-
ered contributions. The relevance of this variable is confined to the category of non-
programmable activities; in the case of the more programmable ones the required informa-
tion must by definition be available beforehand. Non-programmable activities carry a certain 
amount of indeterminacy as a result of uncertainty. This condition may dissolve over time 
when in the process of contract execution, information accrues on the actual state of the 
world and more intimate knowledge on the particulars of the activities becomes available, 
allowing the organization to ‘recognize the quality of performance when it sees it’. If these 
emerging insights spread through the organization, gradually becoming common knowledge, 
post hoc performance appraisal may be fairly uncontroversial. In this case, the organization is 
able to evaluate performance using emergent standards that are shared (or at least known) 
by those involved in the process. This is a situation of relatively low ex post information 
asymmetry. If, however, the information on performance and contextual details that accrues 
during the process of delivering the contribution cannot be communicated to other members 
of the organization in a reliable way, information asymmetry remains high. This situation may 
for instance arise when the relevant information is highly specialized in character (e.g. expert 
information), in the context of high task interdependence (cf. Jones, 1984), or when it is not 
possible to protect the information from opportunistic manipulation by the sender at accept-
able cost. Then, the organization is effectually unable to assess the quality of performance, 
even after it has been delivered. 
 
3.4 Linking control problems and solutions 
 
The attributes of the activity to be controlled are related to predictable control problems, 
and scoring the activity on these attributes allows identification of the associated set of 
expected control problems. These different problem sets require different solutions, i.e. a 
different MC structure. Although MC structures may conceivably come in a large variety, the 
configurational assumption is that they are in fact variations on a not so large number of 
common themes. This allows empirical variety to be reduced to differences among a more 
manageable number of representative archetypal MC structures. The next step, then, is to 
describe these control archetypes in terms of their elementary composition and their distinc-
tive problem-solving ability, and to match these in a discriminating way with the control 
needs that are associated with particular activities as defined by their scores on the attrib-
utes asset specificity, programmability, and ex post information asymmetry. As a precursor to 
the fuller exposition of the arguments in current section, figure 1 outlines the resulting 
perspective, whereas table 1 describes the archetypes along four broad dimensions that 
collectively cover the most important areas of variation between observable control struc-
tures. These are (1) the organizational structure, e.g. level of centralization, room for 
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discretionary behavior, and allocation and demarcation of responsibilities; (2) standardiza-
tion, covering issues as to the source and relative importance of ex ante norms and standards 
to guide behavior; (3) monitoring and performance evaluation, comprising such matters as the 
scope and intensity of monitoring and the nature of performance benchmarks; and (4) the 
reward and incentive structure. 
 
 
[TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TAKE IN TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Arm’s length control 
 
In the group of programmable activities, where control takes a prescriptive orientation, the 
emphasis will be on compliance to the predefined norms and standards. When asset specific-
ity is moderate, promulgation and sometimes even enforcement of these norms and standards 
may partly be left to the market, and managerial involvement in control may be limited 
correspondingly (cf. Jones & Hill, 1988). Because in this situation there is at least some 
competition between alternative sources of supply and demand6, the question as to what 
constitutes adequate performance is answered in part by the market, thus giving contracting 
parties some common reference point against which to assess the reasonableness of their 
expectations and on which to base the control structure. However, asset specificity being 
moderate, competition is not strong enough to provide self-sufficient safeguards, and addi-
tional control mechanisms will be installed. Within arm’s length control, these include 
continuous access to the rich repertoire of managerial intervention; probably in conjunction 
with performance-based compensation plans to increase goal congruence between the 
contracting parties. However, typical for arm’s length control is that the intervention reper-
toire is only called upon in case performance drifts out of line with the market, allowing 
detached control and providing transaction cost benefits by economizing on management’s 
time. Because in this archetype the contributor retains significant autonomy, the term arm’s 
length control seems an appropriate label. Arm’s length control is associated with generic, 
relatively unspecific activities for which an outside market exists, but that are internalized 
nonetheless7. 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, this need not always be true. Conceivably, asset specificity may also be 
low in absence of outside competition. This would be the case when some unique monopolis-
tic asset is deployable in several alternative ways. This situation, however, has limited 
empirical relevance and may, therefore, safely be ignored. 
7 There may be many reasons to internalize such activities. One example may be the presence 
of site specificity, making internalization sensible, but still allowing performance benchmark-
ing. Another reason could be the wish to preserve some in-house production capacity to serve 
as a credible threat in the dealings with outside suppliers. Preservation of a ‘window on 
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Machine control 
 
High programmability is associated with prescriptive control and a focus on compliance to 
pre-set norms and standards. However, given a high degree of asset specificity, these norms 
and standards cannot be culled from market interaction as in arm’s length control, but need 
to be defined within the organization. The resulting structure strongly resembles the mecha-
nistic organization described by Burns & Stalker (1961), the machine bureaucracy portrayed 
by Mintzberg (1983), and Ouchi’s bureaucracy (1979). It features standardization and regula-
tion of behavior, codification of budget targets, detailed monitoring, systematic measure-
ment of performance on pre-defined dimensions, and clearly identified areas of accountabil-
ity, usually mirrored in the organizational structure. Its emphasis on programming, progress 
monitoring, and correcting deviations from pre-set directions suggests the label machine 
control for this structure. 
 The machine control archetype is a structure that is associated with mature programs 
and routine activities. This archetype can be refined by distinguishing action oriented and 
result oriented machine control types. In the action oriented approach, control is predomi-
nantly achieved via codification of actions and supervising observance of the rules and 
instructions, whereas control of the result oriented kind hinges primarily on target-setting, 
accountability, and reward structures that serve to encourage target-directed behavior. This 
distinction has been dealt with quite extensively in the literature -see for instance Merchant’s 
results controls and action accountability controls (Merchant, 1982, 1985b), and Ouchi’s 
behavior control versus output control (Ouchi, 1977)- and need no amplification here, except 
for the efficiency properties of the alternatives. 
 In many instances, there will be no real choice between action oriented control and the 
result oriented approach, simply because the available information enables the one and not 
the other (Merchant, 1982, 1985b; Snell, 1992). Then, straightforward feasibility considera-
tions will be decisive. But when both approaches are feasible, result control will usually reign 
for it tends to require less elaborate structuring –thus relieving the pressure on bounded 
rationality-, is likely to demand less higher level management involvement, and is more 
supportive of adaptation. The latter aspect is important when –low uncertainty notwithstand-
ing- there may still be some unanticipated disturbances or opportunities demanding a flexible 
response. The result control variant offers subordinates the discretion to affect that response 
and may rely on a performance-dependent reward system to provide the appropriate incen-
tives (Snell, 1992), whereas the action oriented alternative has no such options and needs to 
revert to time-consuming hierarchical redefinition of required behavior. 
 
Exploratory control 
 
Low programmability implies the inability to define in advance the attainable outcomes of 
the activity. Also, it implies that any up front selection of the courses of action that are most 
                                                                                                                                               
technology’ to facilitate future entry in markets not currently considered vital may also 
account for internalization of activities that are relatively unspecific. 
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likely to contribute to satisfactory outcomes is bound to require revision along the way. 
Explicit contracting for concrete actions or contributions is not feasible, and such activities 
must start out with little preconceived guidance, i.e. as steps on an uncharted route, the 
traveling of which requires considerable discretionary authority at the level of the travelers. 
Following that route, however, is a learning process, and in that process, participants acquire 
an increasingly deeper understanding of the activity and how they should go about it. This 
understanding arises from experience, and is thus likely to be asymmetrically distributed (it is 
only gained by those who actually had the experience) and dispersed (different individuals 
have different tasks in the activity and their experiences relate to different aspects of the 
project). Sharing of information, then, becomes vital to decide on the next step on the route 
and to encourage a sense of coherence in participants’ efforts. 
 Prompt and undistorted sharing of information, however, may conflict with perceived 
self-interest, because individuals may expect that this information will not only be used for 
learning purposes and as input for emergent patterns of action, but also for ex post evalua-
tion of individual performance. In that case, one must expect the information to be biased in 
an attempt to inflate the perception of the quality of performance. In that process, relevant 
details may be suppressed or become twisted, thus diminishing the value of the information 
flows for evaluative purposes, but also for learning purposes. 
 To find a way out of this dilemma, formal instruments of control have not much to offer, 
and exploratory control is highly informal in nature. It is quite strongly related to Mintzberg’s 
adhocracy (1983). It is also closely akin to the organic organization described by Burns & 
Stalker (1961). It can be found in innovation-driven (parts of) organizations, but also in 
organizations going through some major transformation that upsets the relevance of existing 
know-how and routines. A typical feature of exploratory control is the absence of clearly 
defined and demarcated individual responsibilities. Rather, it blends permeable matrix-like 
structures with fluid project teams that are formed and dismantled according to perceived 
needs as they emerge. Individual responsibilities follow assignments and, like the assignments 
themselves, are in a permanent state of flux, not getting the time to sink in. Responsibilities, 
thus, remain unclear. In part, this is a predictable consequence of the impossibility to define 
in advance what to expect from those involved in the organization, and as such, it may be 
seen as part of the problem. But it is also part of the solution in that it is a means to encour-
age a problem-solving attitude, for unclear responsibilities make it harder to refer a problem 
to someone else as being his or her responsibility (cf. Burns & Stalker, 1961). Essentially, a 
problem becomes the responsibility of the individual that just happened to stumble upon it 
first. Solving the problem, then, is likely to extend beyond the capacity of that individual, 
and he or she must often solicit help from other members of the organization. This serves as a 
catalyst for information sharing and learning, and it also creates an atmosphere in which 
cooperation is self-enforcing: next time, the shoe may be on the other foot, and providing 
help is the best strategy to ensure receiving help on future occasions. Furthermore, it creates 
an incentive to strive for at least satisfactory performance. Because individuals in this 
structure depend upon one another for the accomplishment of their own tasks and duties, 
substandard achievement by some individual tends to interfere with the performance of 
direct colleagues on whom the individual depends himself. Coupled with the organic informa-
tion flows that accompany the multitude of cooperative relationships that arises, opportunis-
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tic inclinations (e.g. shirking, withholding or manipulating information) become hard to 
sustain (cf. Marginson, 1999). Moreover, higher level management itself will be involved quite 
closely in the entire process in a supportive role, reinforcing strategic intentions, giving 
advice, questioning decisions, asking for explanations et cetera. This involvement is valuable 
in that it serves coordination and information sharing. But in addition, it ensures that infor-
mation relevant for assessment of individual performance reaches the proper hierarchical 
levels. 
 In this structure, it is not necessary to explicate in advance the criteria that will be used 
in individual performance evaluation. Simple, open-ended exhortations (‘do your best’) 
suffice. The relevant criteria emerge in the process and are known to those involved, because 
they are part of that very process. Moreover, individuals know that the organization is well-
equipped to assess ex post the quality of individual’s contribution to the longer-term devel-
opment of the organization. Then, a simple ‘do your best’ becomes a meaningful message.  
 It must be noted that exploratory control is a markedly indulgent structure. It may be 
sufficient to activate goal-consistent behavior, but it does not necessarily produce the level 
of effort the organization desires. Its reliance on cooperation and mutual adjustment foster 
close personal relations, which may easily create a lenient atmosphere in which it is hard to 
blow the whistle (Jones, 1984). In addition, this archetype’s demand for extensive communi-
cation and consultation is resource consuming. A similar remark applies to its unstructured 
routing of problems, which cannot assure smooth problem handling. That is why as soon as 
insights into the properties of required contributions settle, elements of machine control gain 
importance, ultimately to supplant the exploratory form. But until then, exploratory control 
may be the best one can do, which explains its existence. 
 
Boundary control 
 
For non-programmable activities that feature incorrigibly high levels of ex post information 
asymmetry, it is not possible to define and evaluate performance, not even after the contri-
bution has been made. This situation arises in the control of activities that require input of 
highly specialized knowledge and skills. The treasury function could be a good example. It is 
quite common that this function is largely beyond the reach of rest of the organization 
(including its top management), for the financial literacy required to understand the particu-
lars of the treasury function and its performance is often present only in the treasury de-
partment itself (cf. Helliar, 1998). In that case, the rest of the organization is unable to 
assess the quality of treasury’s performance and, a fortiori, unable to provide much guidance 
to that department. However, even though one may be unable to specify what one expects 
from the activity, one will usually have at least some notion as to the factors that may 
actually jeopardize the business. These factors become the primary object of control. Thus, 
the aim of control shifts from ensuring desired contributions to the prevention of unwanted 
actions or outcomes. Following Simons (1995), such proscriptive control may be labeled 
boundary control. 
 Because the information asymmetry that defies performance assessment will also defy a 
reasonably complete ex ante specification of actions to be avoided, and because that same 
asymmetry stands in the way of systematic detection of rule-breaking behavior, boundary 
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control must be expected to leave considerable room for dysfunctional behavior. Neither is it 
likely to bring much coherence to the efforts of those involved in the organization. Therefore, 
boundary control is very much the structure of last resort, only to be expected in conditions 
where more positive guidance cannot be given and enforced. If such conditions apply, how-
ever, boundary control is (relatively) effective, for it is the best one can do. 
4. Precursory notes on testing 
The ideas advanced in this paper have been presented without empirical backing. They are 
very much the result of a ground-clearing exercise, and a lot of work remains to be done. 
However, since every theory must be prepared to submit itself to empirical scrutiny, this 
section discusses how the transaction cost theory of management control can be tested, and 
identifies a number of challenges that must be confronted in the process. Because this 
discussion works from a very demanding notion of testing –it more or less describes the 
supreme test rather than a mere useful one-, and because the challenges that arise there are 
actually quite hard, this section also discusses a less ambitious –but nonetheless useful- 
research agenda. 
 
4.1 The grand test 
 
The central claim of this paper is that the archetypes of control represent efficient (or at 
least effective) solutions to specific sets of control problems, and that these sets of problems 
vary with the characteristics of the activities. Thus, given the characteristics of the activities, 
an empirically observed control structure is conjectured to be more efficient the closer it 
resembles the relevant ideal type. This is the key hypothesis of the proposed theory, and 
appropriate tests should focus on this hypothesis. 
 It is not sufficient –and not valid either- to categorize organizational subsystems as 
belonging to one of the ideal types and then comparing effectiveness among the categories. 
Although this procedure has often been applied in testing configurational theories (cf. Doty, 
Glick, & Huber, 1993), it is deficient for two main reasons. First, as it treats the configura-
tions in the theory as categories rather than ideal types, marginal members of the categories 
are predicted to be as effective as their central members. In fact, however, the theory 
predicts that organizational subsystems that only marginally resemble the appropriate 
archetype are –on average- less effective than the ones that closely resemble them (Doty & 
Glick, 1994). Second, this procedure ignores the equifinality notion (Doty et al., 1993; Doty & 
Glick, 1994; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Meyer et al., 1993) –the idea that (in the appropriate 
circumstances) each of the ideal types represents effective control. As a consequence, there 
is not much use in comparing for instance the performance of machine control and explora-
tory control when the circumstances are such that machine control is not a feasible alterna-
tive anyway. And even if it were useful for some reason, it is not a test of the proposed 
theory because the theory says nothing about performance differences among the archetypes. 
 Any genuine test of a theory should involve its key hypothesis. For the current theory, 
this implies that it is necessary somehow to measure the deviation of actually observed 
control structures from the relevant archetype, and then to link these deviations to the 
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performance of the structures. The technical apparatus to do this and the methodological 
background are relatively well developed. Dess et al. (1993), Doty et al. (1993), and 
-especially- Doty & Glick (1994) provide excellent overviews and discussions of the issues 
involved. The consensus proposal is to use (weighted) Euclidean distances to measure the 
deviations (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Doty et al., 1993; Doty & Glick, 1994; see also Selto, 
Renner, & Young, 1995, for an application in the context of MC). This, however, requires 
formal modeling of the ideal types. It also requires operationalizing effectiveness. Both are 
real challenges, as the following discussion shows. 
 
4.2 Modeling the ideal types 
 
A precise definition of the archetypes is vital to assess the similarity between an actual 
control configuration and the archetypes in a formal way. The description of the ideal types 
in this paper, however, is indicative and far from unambiguous. Although the discussion in 
section 3 and the summary in table 1 may offer valuable input to a more precise definition, 
they are mere initial steps, guided by the wish to provide some feel for the archetypes rather 
than to present a rigorous model. Translating these ‘rich descriptions’ in more formal lan-
guage is a demanding task, however. It is very difficult to be rigorous whilst simultaneously 
maintaining an open eye for the intricacies of organizational life. 
 One problem here is to adequately capture the nuances of control. For instance, a strong 
reliance on budgets in situations in which exploratory control is expected to reign would at 
first glance result in expected inefficiency because it seems inconsistent with the emergent 
standards theme. Budgets, however, can be used in many different ways. If the organization 
uses the budget interactively rather than diagnostically (Simons, 1995), it may still fit the 
idea of exploratory control and be effective (see Simons, 1987, for an empirical study illus-
trating this use of budgets in a setting of uncertainty that appears to call for exploratory 
control-like structures). Such details are easily overlooked in the process of drafting one’s 
definitions and in their subsequent use. They are essential nonetheless. 
 Another problem is to assign weights to the dimensions and constructs used to describe 
the archetypes. Not all deviations from the ideal type are equally important. In machine 
control for instance, it may not matter much whether or not the organization assigns financial 
bonuses to target achievement, especially not when the conditions are such that unforeseen 
adaptation is hardly ever an issue and when more intensive monitoring compensates for the 
absence of bonuses. As before, it may be very hard fully to specify such details in advance, 
and then to fold them back into some relatively unambiguous set of weights. To be sure, it is 
possible to identify some key attributes of each ideal type. Arm’s length control depends 
vitally on the combination of market-derived performance standards and limited senior 
management involvement. Critical for machine control is its strong reliance on ex ante 
defined norms, standards, and targets. Exploratory control hinges on emergent standards and 
an organizational structure to support that. Finally, boundary control essentially rests on 
codes of conducts. These key attributes (and deviations from them) should be weighted 
relatively heavily. But this is still very crude, and one must go beyond this to accomplish truly 
decisive testing. 
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4.3 Operationalizing effectiveness 
 
It has already been emphasized that the principal claim of the proposed theory is that control 
structures that more closely resemble the relevant archetype are more effective than control 
structures that are less similar to that ideal type. Thus, testing requires measurement of 
control structure effectiveness. This, however, is problematic. Whereas there is “universal 
acceptance that the Holy Grail for management control systems researchers is effectiveness” 
(Machin, 1983: 37), it has proven to be an elusive concept and explicit examinations of 
control structure effectiveness are quite rare indeed -perhaps because Holy Grails tend to be 
hard to find. Nevertheless, the widely held view that MC is a means to support achievement 
of organizational goals implies that explaining MC must involve some demonstration of the 
actual contribution of observed MC practices to the attainment of these goals. 
 Although far from being the Holy Grail, TCE’s remediableness criterion does come some 
way in addressing the issue of control structure effectiveness. The remediableness test is a 
reasonably concrete and practicable procedure that makes remarkably few assumptions as to 
organizational goals and motives. It merely requires acceptance of a general preference for 
more effective structures over less effective ones: organizations prefer structures that 
actually work to structures that are less helpful (or more wasteful) in getting them what they 
want. And the idea of comparing an actual structure with realistically conceivable alterna-
tives, and thinking these through in terms of their differential effects, is simple, widely 
applicable, and instructive. At the very least, it gives the analysis a clear sense of direction, 
forcing the researcher to explicate how the structure deals with the relevant control prob-
lems, and how this compares to the problem-solving ability and costs of alternative struc-
tures. Unfortunately, however, it is not good enough for the purpose of rigorously testing the 
current theory. Unless one is able to quantify the transaction costs, the remediableness test 
does not actually measure effectiveness and efficiency. But then, some form of quantification 
is necessary for the grand test suggested in section 4.1. 
 One rather obvious way to operationalize control structure effectiveness is to assume 
that it translates into organizational effectiveness, and then to measure the latter. Of course, 
organizational effectiveness is itself an inherently hazy construct, but it has a long history in 
empirical studies, and by now we may well have learned to live with its ambiguity. There are, 
however, two difficulties here. One of these has to do with the tenuous relation between 
control structure effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. Control structure effective-
ness is but one of many factors influencing organizational performance, and this influence is 
probabilistic rather that deterministic. The other –and perhaps more serious one- is that the 
proposed theory has been formulated at the level of the organizational subsystems (divisions, 
departments, business units and the like) rather than at the level of the organization as a 
whole. Performance data at the subsystem level are not easily available. And then, how does 
one measure the performance of, say, the R&D department or the treasury department? 
Worse still, how does one measure the performance of an R&D department in a way that 
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allows comparison with the performance of some other department with different activities, 
but a similar control structure8? This is nevertheless a prerequisite for broad sample testing. 
 
4.4 A less ambitious agenda 
 
Having discussed some of the problems associated with testing the transaction cost theory of 
MC, it makes sense to consider the implications for the research agenda connected with this 
theory. An important remark in advance, though, is that one should not make too much of 
these problems. The problems have been discussed against the background of what an ideal, 
truly decisive test would look like, and the discussion has focused on what would be required 
to be able to perform such a sublime test. However, we do not normally apply such demand-
ing standards to the theories we use, and once-and-for-all tests of entire theories are quite 
rare indeed. Instead, empirical studies usually proceed in a piecemeal fashion, taking ele-
ments of theories as the focal point or concentrating on restricted settings, and slowly but 
steadily working their way through the theory. Furthermore, many of the problems are not 
unique to the present theory, but are shared by most theories –although not necessarily to the 
same extent. Also, it is quite natural for new theories to be informal in their early stages of 
development. And finally, the problems discussed in this paper can be solved –at least in 
principle. In fact, they have been solved for theories of similar complexity (cf. Doty et al., 
1993, for a test of Mintzberg’s typology and Miles & Snow’s work). Nevertheless, the ultimate 
test of the transaction cost theory of MC will probably be pending for a while. 
 In the meantime, there are many less demanding empirical avenues to explore. A first 
step could be to apply the approach in a series of illustrative case studies (Keating, 1995; 
Otley & Berry, 1994). Illustrative case studies aim to establish the usefulness of a theoretical 
perspective by examining its capacity to illuminate some significant aspects of observable 
control practices. Such studies may help to gauge the extent to which the theory is useful in 
making sense of control. Another initial step may be to concentrate on the question whether 
configurations actually exist. If one scores actual control structures on multiple dimensions, is 
there actually something like “densely occupied regions of the data space” (Miller, 1999: 28)? 
And if so, do these empirically observed patterns show any correspondence to the proposed 
theory? Yet another instructive path may be to focus initially on the predictive power of the 
theory in specific, relatively homogeneous settings –say control within R&D departments in 
the pharmaceutical industry or control of the treasury function in multinational agribusi-
nesses. Modeling the relevant ideal types in such specific settings may be much easier than 
specifying them in a universal way. Similarly, operationalizing the attributes of the activities 
(uncertainty, asset specificity, and ex post information asymmetry) and control structure 
effectiveness are likely to be less complicated in restricted settings. Of course, such studies 
are not a direct test of the theory per se, but they are useful nonetheless –both as additions 
to the empirical basis of the theory, and as contributions to our understanding of control in 
                                                 
8 Of course, the theory suggests that in order to find a similar control structure, the activities 
must also be similar. But this similarity is confined to the dimensions asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and ex post information asymmetry. This leaves open many dimensions on which 
the activities may differ.  
 18
these specific settings. A last suggestion involves a longitudinal study, concentrating on 
control structure change. If organizations do in fact prefer structures that actually work to 
structures that are less effective or more wasteful in getting them what they want, one would 
expect that on average, control structures change over time to become more similar to the 
appropriate ideal type. This is a testable proposition, and one that may help to avoid having 
to operationalize effectiveness. It is also a partial and somewhat indirect test in that it 
presumes effectiveness seeking as an important driver of control structure design, rather than 
actually testing for that. But then, one must start somewhere. 
 Interestingly, some of these suggestions come pretty close to the path actually taken in 
empirical research in TCE in general. Case-like work and series of applications to specific, 
largely single industry settings have shown that applying TCE is both feasible and helpful (cf. 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Shelanski & Klein, 1995, for recent overviews of empirical research 
in TCE). And by now, this work is so voluminous that it amounts to an enviably solid empirical 
basis for TCE in general. 
5. Some final remarks 
Obviously, this paper is very much the result of a ground-clearing exercise, and there are 
many issues that deserve a fuller treatment than they have in fact been given. In this final 
section, I seek to address a few of these loose ends. 
 A particularly apparent omission relates to the role and position of strategy in the 
proposed theory. For surely, the idea that organizational structures (including control struc-
tures) and strategy are interconnected has been a recurrent theme in the literature at least 
since Chandler’s seminal work (Chandler, 1962). To capture this interconnectedness, it may 
be productive to assume that strategy affects the attributes of the activities in which the 
organization engages, which in turn affect the control problems that need to be dealt with 
and the relative efficiency of alternative control configurations. This seems intuitively 
plausible. It is also an approach with some history in the literature. For instance, Jones & Hill 
(1988) argue that different growth strategies (unrelated diversification, vertical integration, 
and related diversification) are associated with different kinds of interdependencies9 (pooled, 
sequential, reciprocal), which need to be controlled in different ways. Similar ideas can be 
found in Hill & Hoskisson (1987) and in Hill et al. (1992). Further work along these lines may 
well pay off. An interesting aspect of this approach is that one can postpone discussion of the 
awkward issue of the specific direction of the relation between strategy and control, i.e. 
whether structure follows strategy (the traditional position) or vice versa, that structure is 
(also) an antecedent of strategy (cf. for instance Burgelman, 1991; Simons, 1995). 
 Another candidate for further development relates to the rather shallow notion of human 
behavior from which this paper works. The assumptions of bounded rationality and opportun-
ism hardly even begin to capture the drives and motives of human behavior, and neglect 
much of the characteristics generally held to be valuable in understanding human agency. The 
need for recognition and respect, the desire to belong, the wish to trust and be trusted –to 
name but a few factors that ‘everybody knows’ to be important- play no explicit role in the 
                                                 
9 Which I subsume –provisionally- under uncertainty; see section 3.3. 
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explanations offered. Also, the proposed theory treats human behavior as atomistic, under-
playing the influence of social context and interaction and representing an undersocialized 
view of human action (Granovetter, 1985). The consequences of this are potentially far-
reaching, because MC operates within an intricate network of social relations, and it is at 
least plausible to assume that the functioning of MC is somehow conditioned by these rela-
tions, and vice versa. However, although the social is plainly underdeveloped in the theory as 
it now stands, it does not actually ignore social mechanisms and processes altogether. Rather, 
it reinterprets mechanisms that are usually considered to belong to the domain of the social 
in economic terms. The examination of exploratory control for instance stresses the effects of 
cooperation, mutual dependency, and personal relations; phenomena that would certainly 
qualify as social. The effects of these phenomena (such as the increased propensity to 
cooperate, the pressure to perform, and the emergence of a lenient atmosphere), however, 
are attributed to (economic) self-interest. This, of course, meets uneasily with common 
knowledge. In a way, the social is being abducted by economics. But then, the effects them-
selves are not contrary to common experience. Assuming that these effects as such are 
satisfactorily dealt with in the approach in its current state of development, incorporating 
the social in the theory would be a refinement rather than an extension. Such a refinement 
would still be important, though, for it would increase the causal articulation of the ap-
proach, improving the insights it provides in the causal processes and mechanisms at work 
(Mäki, in press). Also, it would align the explanation more closely with common sense. 
 A last remark of a theoretical nature regards the functionalist nature of the theory: it 
seeks to explain control with reference to efficiency, but it does not actually specify the 
causal mechanisms that give rise to efficient alignments. This is a gap that the theory shares 
with its intellectual ancestor TCE. It is also a rather innocent gap that can temporarily be 
accepted as long as the functional reasoning is merely used to provide a stepping stone on the 
way to full explanatory theorizing (Jackson, 2002). 
 Refinement and further development are, of course, only worthwhile if the theory has 
any significant empirical merit. Supposing that it does, the perspective appears to have 
practical value, too. One advantage of configurational approaches is that their ideal types can 
serve as mental models that can guide analysis and evaluation of actual organizations. Even 
the most outspoken opponents of configurational thinking are willing to grant that (cf. 
Donaldson, 2001). And this is precisely where the value of the proposed theory is located for 
most practical purposes. The ideal types as such are not ideal in a normative sense. Because 
the theory only purports to cover those factors that vary systematically over larger popula-
tions, it does not supply any hard prescriptions as to how to configure the control structures 
in a specific real life situation. In such specific instances, there is usually a whole host of 
specific factors to take into account –the effects of which may well be more important in that 
individual situation than the effects of the general factors. Nevertheless, the theory offers a 
general and broadly applicable frame of reference to support a systematic analysis of control 
problems, and that provides systematic clues as to the direction in which to search for 
solutions. 
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Figure 1: Archetypes of control and their habitat 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the control archetypes 
 
 Arm’s Length Control 
Machine Control 
(Action Oriented) 
Machine Control 
(Result Oriented) 
Exploratory Control Boundary Control 
Structure 
Relative autonomy; 
involvement higher level 
management limited long as 
performance is satisfactory 
Well-defined tasks; strict 
hierarchy; limited room for 
discretionary behavior 
Decentralized with clearly 
defined areas of responsibil-
ity and accountability 
Relatively flat hierarchy; 
fluid and permeable matrix-
like project structures; 
vague responsibilities 
Relative autonomy within 
defined boundaries 
Standardization 
Market-related outcome 
requirements; external 
performance benchmarks 
Standardization of behavior; 
detailed rules, norms, and 
instructions 
Predefined performance 
targets of administrative 
origins 
No ex ante standards and 
targets; ‘do your best’; 
emerging standards 
Proscriptive codes of 
conduct; boundary systems; 
emphasis on behavior to be 
avoided 
Monitoring and 
performance 
evaluation 
Performance assessment 
relative to ‘the market’ 
Monitoring and supervision to 
ensure compliance to norms 
and standards 
Monitoring focused on target 
achievement; performance 
assessment relative to 
targets 
Based on emerging stan-
dards; subjectively assessed 
contributions to long term 
organizational performance 
Focused on compliance; 
observance of interdictions; 
external audits 
Reward & 
incentive 
structure 
Performance dependent 
bonuses 
No direct link between 
performance and rewards 
Performance dependent 
bonuses 
Career prospects dependent 
on long term past perform-
ance; peer pressure 
Emphasis on threat of 
punishment of rule-breaking 
behavior; tie-in through 
‘hostages’ 
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